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DO PROPERTY RIGHTS PRESUPPOSE SCARCITY? 
David Faraci 
 
There is a common view, dating back at least to Hume, that property rights 
presuppose scarcity—i.e., that a good’s being scarce is a condition of its legitimately 
being property.1 Arguments for this claim can be found not only in the 
philosophical literature, but in legal discussions of property rights tracing back at 
least to the end of the 19th century.2 Until recently, this view was primarily relevant 
only in debates about Intellectual Property (IP), for ideas were the only (arguably) 
non-scarce goods people claimed ownership in. Today, however, there are a number 
of other non-scarce goods—notably digital media and software3—that people are 
likewise granted property rights in. What’s more, speculations about future 
technologies—particularly those surrounding nanotechnology and the possibility of 
atomic/molecular manipulation—suggest that more and more goods that are 
currently scarce may no longer be in the future (e.g., essentially infinite amounts of 
food will be producible at infinitesimal cost in “matter compilers” or “replicators,” 
to use a popular science fiction example). Because of these developments it is vital, 
now more than ever, that we clarify the relationship between scarcity and property 
rights, independently of specific concerns about the legitimacy of IP.  
I begin, in §1, by laying out what I take to be the major line of defense for 
the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity. In brief, the argument is that (1) 
                                               
1 It might be more accurate to say that, for Hume, property rights presuppose non-desperate 
scarcity, since extreme scarcity can undermine the justification of property rights just as easily 
as extreme abundance. However, since my focus here is on the latter, I set this aside in what 
follows. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the need to address this point. 
Hume discusses this issue in both A Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the 
Principles of Morals. Also see, e.g., Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism; Kinsella, 
Against Intellectual Property; Palmer, “Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and 
Economics Approach”; Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy 
of Property Rights and Ideal Objects”; Plant, “The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for 
Inventions”; Rothbard, “Justice and Property Rights”; McElroy, “Intellectual Property: Copyright 
and Patent” (on Benjamin Tucker). 
2 “The necessity which is recognize in all civilised societies of conferring rights of private or 
personal property arises from the limited supply of that for which there is an unlimited demand. 
It is only from a limitation of supply that there can be any value in exchange.” Great Britain and 
Stephen, Copyright Commission, xlviii. 
3 Of course, ownership of these is often protected through IP practices. But the manifestations of 
these goods are themselves arguably non-scarce, unlike in the case of, for example, (non-
electronic) books. 
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property rights are legitimate only when necessary, (2) necessary only for avoiding 
injuries resulting from one party’s use of a good over another’s, and (3) that such 
injury is possible only where there is scarcity. While I accept (1) (at least for the 
sake of argument), I argue in §2 that each of three prominent theories of the 
justification of property rights appeal to values that may well undermine (2) and/or 
(3). In §3, I consider what this implies for the thesis in question. As it turns out, at 
the theoretical level, there are a number of different ways one might deal with the 
apparent conflict between the argument in §1 and the views discussed in §2. 
However, I argue that no matter which theoretical path one takes, it turns out the 
practical implications of the relationship between property rights and scarcity have 
been woefully misconstrued. Finally, in §4, I recount an independent argument for 
the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity and argue that, whether or not it 
is successful as an argument against IP (as well as, perhaps, other kinds of property 
rights), it does not extend as an argument against ownership of non-scarce goods in 
general. This discussion serves to further highlight the need to distinguish 
arguments for the thesis under consideration from arguments against IP.  
Before embarking, a brief word concerning the nature of property rights. As 
mentioned above, arguments for the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity 
have primarily been deployed to object to specific property rights practices, such as 
copyright and patent law in the United States. Given this, I wish to remain as 
neutral as possible regarding the theoretical nature of property. Indeed, “property” 
is not really at stake here. What matters is the justification for granting particular 
sorts of exclusive rights over goods. My target is the claim that granting such rights 
is unjustified where goods are abundant. 
With that in mind, let us proceed with a modified version of A.M. Honoré’s 
widely endorsed conception of property as a “bundle of rights.” On Honoré’s 
account, this bundle consists of 11 “sticks” or “incidents”: rights to (1) possess, (2) 
use, (3) manage, (4) receive income from, (5) consume or destroy, (6) be secure in 
ownership of and (7) transfer one’s property, as well as (8) to have these rights 
persist over time; along with duties (9) not to use one’s property harmfully; (10) to 
be liable to dissolution of ownership in cases of debt or insolvency, and (11) to 
respect any residual entitlements others may have in one’s property.4  
Unfortunately, not everyone agrees that all of the incidents Honoré 
mentions should be included on the list. Jeremy Waldon,5 for instance, argues 
against inclusion of the ninth incident, on grounds that the duty not to use property 
                                               
4 See Honoré, “Ownership.” 
5 Waldron, The Right to Private Property. 
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harmfully is merely an implication of a general duty against harm, rather than 
being a part of the nature of ownership itself.6 
Since it is far beyond the scope of this paper to resolve matters such as this, 
let us move forward on the assumption that, schematically, systems of property 
rights will mimic, though perhaps not precisely match, Honoré’s—they will grant a 
bundle of exclusive rights (liberties, obligations, etc.), or some part thereof, 
including some of those listed above, to individuals or groups of individuals, with 
respect to particular goods. This should serve as a sufficiently generic account of 
property rights to encompass all schemes that are intuitively recognizable as 
property rights practices, without being so indeterminate as to fail to provide a 
genuine target. 
 
1. In Defense of the Thesis that Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity 
For what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one has 
already more than enough? Why give rise to property, where there 
cannot possibly be any injury? Why call this object mine, when 
upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out my hand to 
possess myself to what is equally valuable? . . . We see, even in the 
present necessitous condition of mankind, that, wherever any 
benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited abundance, we leave it 
always in common among the whole human race, and make no 
subdivisions of right and property. Water and air, though the most 
necessary of all objects, are not challenged as the property of 
individuals; nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish 
use and enjoyment of these blessings.7 
Working backwards, Hume provides us with two concrete examples of 
(apparently) non-scarce goods: water and air. Hume does not actually use the word 
“scarcity” here.8 Nevertheless, he clearly implicates scarcity when he characterizes 
these as goods which are “bestowed by nature in unlimited abundance.”  
Of course, this cannot quite be taken literally. Water and air are not, in fact, 
unlimited; there are finite amounts of each, and so Hume’s statement is at least 
                                               
6 Peter Jaworski and I argue something similar with respect to liability in our “To Inspect and 
Make Safe: Morally Responsible Liability in Property Ownership.” 
7 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, sec. III. 
8 Though he does so elsewhere: “[T]he situation of external objects is their easy change, join’d 
to their scarcity in comparison of the wants and desires of men.” A Treatise of Human Nature, 
bk. III, sec. II. 
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somewhat hyperbolic. Luckily, we can get a sense of what his real concern is by 
looking earlier in the passage: Hume cannot see why we would grant property 
rights in a good if everyone were assured of having enough of it. If my breathing 
the air does not prevent you from having enough air for yourself, Hume seems to 
be saying, it is hard to see how my breathing the air could do you any injury. And if 
my breathing the air cannot do you any injury, what possible justification could 
there be for granting either of us exclusive rights in it? 
Given the nature of this argument, it seems to me that Hume’s comments 
here are best understood in terms of the non-rivalrousness of goods like water and 
air. A good is rivalrous just in case its possession by one party precludes its 
possession by another. Goods which are non-rivalrous are “unlimited” not in the 
literal sense of being infinite in quantity, but in the sense that one can possess the 
relevant good regardless of who else does.  
For the purposes of the arguments to come (though I revisit this issue in §3), 
I will thus understand a good’s being scarce to be synonymous with its being 
rivalrous, with one qualification. Note that while we have been discussing air as a 
non-rivalrous good, oxygen molecules are rivalrous—my possession (breathing) of 
them interferes with yours. Thus, when we discuss rivalry in the context of scarcity, 
we must be clear that we are talking about good types rather than good tokens. 
Particular oxygen molecules are rivalrous, true, but oxygen generally speaking is 
not, because (again, in most circumstances) there is sufficient oxygen readily 
available that one person’s breathing oxygen does not interfere with anyone else’s 
doing the same. 
With this in hand, we can give a fuller characterization of the argument for 
the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity. First, Hume seems to be 
appealing to an implicit premise that property rights are in need of justification. 
This is not surprising, given that for Hume, property rights are conventional—they 
are not (contra others9) grounded in natural rights of any kind. As Hume’s opening 
questions suggest, it may be hard to see why, in the absence of such natural rights, 
we would grant persons exclusive rights in goods—how our situation could 
necessitate making “a partition of goods.” Surely, the burden of justification falls on 
those who propose such a partition, not those who would challenge it. Thus, we are 
asked to accept: 
P1   Property rights are legitimate only insofar as they are necessary. 
This leads naturally to the question of when property rights are necessary. 
Hume tells us when they are not: Property rights are unnecessary if the use or 
                                               
9 E.g., Locke or Hegel, more on whom later.  
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possession of a good by one party does not cause or constitute injury to others.10 
According to Hume, such injury is impossible if everyone has enough of the good in 
question. Thus, Hume seems to suggest that we should accept: 
P2 Property rights are necessary only to avoid injury resulting from 
one party’s use or possession of a good over another’s. 
P3 There can be such injury due to use of goods of type G only if goods 
of type G are scarce. 
Together, P1-P3 entail that property rights are legitimate only for scarce 
goods. This argument seems to be what many—certainly, I think, Hume—have had 
in mind in defending the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity.11 
Of course, this is not the only argument one might offer for this conclusion. 
For example, one might hold that the relationship between property rights and 
scarcity is just part of the meaning of “property.” Indeed, some seem to follow this 
suggestion. Kinsella, for example, discusses “the importance of scarcity in defining 
what property is”12 and claims that in a world without scarcity, “property concepts 
would be meaningless.”13 Similarly, Hoppe claims that “any ethic, correctly 
conceived, must be formulated as a theory of property, i.e., a theory of the 
assignment of rights of exclusive control over scarce means.”14 But this is surely 
hyperbolic. It might be true that property rights do not legitimately extend to non-
scarce goods; but surely those who believe that they do are not confused about 
what “property” means. Property rights are not defined in terms of rights over 
scarce goods; whether they extend to scarce goods is an open question. 
Assuming, then, that P1-P3 provide the standard and, perhaps, the strongest 
case for the view in question, let us consider how strong the argument actually is. 
 I have already said something about why one would want to accept P1, 
given that property rights seem in need of justification. I will assume, in what 
follows, that P1 is indeed true. Thus, in what follows, I consider what we should say 
about P2 and P3. 
 
 
 
                                               
10 That is, the use or possession merely as such. Obviously, even non-scarce goods—say, 3D-
printed guns—could be used to injure.  
11 Compare, especially, Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 29–31. 
12 Ibid., 29, emphasis added. 
13 Ibid., 31. 
14 Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, 235 n. 9, emphasis added. 
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2. P2 and P3 
In preparation for examining P2 and P3, notice that on a view like Hume’s, where 
all rights are conventional, we may not have a readymade account of what 
constitutes an injury—or, perhaps, which potential injuries are morally relevant. 
Yet, clearly, some lines will be drawn. For instance, we are unlikely to countenance 
the “injury” that befalls Jill the misanthrope when others have things they desire. 
Aside from the intuitive reasons for thinking we wouldn’t want our property rights 
scheme to countenance such “injuries,” it should be clear that Hume must set them 
aside, as Jill can clearly be “injured” in this way regardless of whether the goods in 
question are scarce. 
What Hume seems to have in mind, here, are only those injuries that result 
from one party’s not being able to have something because another party does. 
Thus, an important question regarding P3 is whether these really are the only sorts 
of injuries that are relevant. If not, we need to ask whether relevant injuries of 
other kinds can result even in the absence of scarcity.  
To help answer this, consider one of the most famous views on the 
justification of property rights: Locke’s labor view of property. Very briefly: Locke 
begins from the premise that we own ourselves. Because I own myself, I own my 
labor, which is a part of me. When I mix my labor with some good, I come to own 
that good as well, with the two provisos that (a) I must not cause waste or spoilage 
and (b) I must leave “enough and as good for others.”15  
Importantly, on this view, when I take ownership of something, taking that 
particular token good away from me might well constitute an injury. Thus, from my 
relationship to that good it may follow that, were that good lost to me, it would not 
be the case that I could simply “stretch out my hand to possess myself to what is 
equally valuable.” Most importantly for our purposes, this seems to be the case 
regardless of how abundant objects of that type are. So it seems that, on a Lockean 
theory, there are injuries that might result from one person’s use or possession of a 
good token over another’s, even where goods of that type are abundant. If the 
Lockean view is correct, we thus have reason to doubt P3.16 
Similar points can be made regarding another historically important 
account. Both Hegel himself and a number of theorists following him have argued 
that property rights are based in a kind of self-expression: 
                                               
15 Locke presents this view in his Two Treatises of Government. See especially Treatise II, 
Sections 27-46. For helpful analysis, see Jaworski, “The Metaphysics of Locke’s Labour View.”  
16 For discussion of relevant arguments concerning the extension of a Lockean theory to IP in 
particular, see Tavani, “Locke, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Information Commons.”  
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A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order 
to exist as Idea. . . . The rationale of property is to be found not in 
the satisfaction of needs but in the supersession [sic.] of the pure 
subjectivity of personality. In his property a person exists for the 
first time as reason. Even if my freedom is here realized first of all in 
an external thing, and so falsely realized, nevertheless abstract 
personality in its immediacy can have no other embodiment save 
one characterized by immediacy.17 
It is not at all difficult to see how this view might—indeed, has18—been 
extended to non-scarce goods. Once again, this seems to be because Hegel’s view, if 
true, undermines P3. My relationship to, say, a particular chair may well make it the 
case that taking that chair away from me does me injury, regardless of how many 
other chairs (perhaps even indistinguishable ones) are available (much as for 
Locke). 
At this point, one might worry about relying too heavily on Locke and 
Hegel to attack Hume’s view. After all, partly because Hume rejects the sorts of 
natural rights upon which Locke and Hegel are relying, he would reject the idea 
that our relationship to a particular object can serve to distinguish a token good (in 
a morally relevant way) from others of its type.  
It is important to recognize, though, that Hume’s rejection of natural rights 
like those Locke and Hegel appeal to depends on aspects of Hume’s view beyond 
what was discussed in constructing the argument above. Thus, in order to defend 
P3, one would need to appeal to further arguments (whether Hume’s or others) 
against the possibility of natural rights like Locke’s and Hegel’s. This is important, 
given that the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity is frequently 
defended, not on such broadly Humean grounds, but only by appeal to the intuitive 
case Hume makes in the passage above, concerning examples like water and air. Of 
course, if most people who defended the thesis that property rights presuppose 
scarcity were Humeans more broadly anyway, this might not be a problem. But 
what makes this situation particularly striking is that many proponents of the 
relationship between property rights and scarcity are not Humeans; many are, in 
fact, libertarians who explicitly endorse certain natural rights. 
It’s not hard to see what’s gone wrong here. It is hard to imagine a case in 
which a particular bit of air or water would be related to an individual in a morally 
relevant way. Thus, when we focus on goods like air and water, Hume’s intuitive 
                                               
17 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, sec. 41. 
18 See, e.g., Resnik, “A Pluralistic Account of Intellectual Property,” 326–327. 
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point seems forceful independently of his rejection of natural rights; we have 
trouble seeing any justification for granting exclusive rights in these goods, and 
generalize to all non-scarce goods. Once we consider views like Locke’s or Hegel’s, 
though, it becomes clear that this is a hasty generalization. There are other types of 
goods—perhaps things we create, for one—such that we may well bear morally 
significant relationships to particular tokens of those types regardless of how 
abundant goods of those types are. 
As an interim conclusion, then, I submit that  P3—the claim that injuries 
resulting from the use or possession of goods depends on scarcity—relies on aspects 
of Hume’s view—viz., rejection of natural rights—that are not only contentious 
generally, but are not even shared by all those who endorse the thesis that property 
rights presuppose scarcity. If such theorists wish to maintain the thesis in question, 
they must find other ways of arguing for it. 
This brings us to P2. Even if there are no relevant injuries in the absence of 
scarcity (perhaps, if Hume is correct about natural rights), we still need defense of 
the claim that property rights are only justified by their role in preventing such 
injuries in the first place. Yet a third prominent view on the justification of property 
rights seems to undermine this claim—indeed, does so without appealing to natural 
rights Hume would balk at. 
Consider the legal justification of IP rights in the United States. Article One 
of the United States Constitution allows for IP rights in order to “promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”19 This is 
an example of a consequentialist or “non-individualistic”20 justification for property 
rights. On models like this, property rights are justified because they further some 
important (social) end (e.g., here, progress). 
Even without this case where consequentialist reasoning is explicitly used 
to extend property rights to non-scarce goods, it should be clear that nothing about 
the consequentialist viewpoint per se should lead us to think that property 
presupposes scarcity. One reason for this, apparently, is that the values of progress 
and innovation being appealed to here have nothing to do with whether violating 
the property rights in question would injure anyone. Rather, the property rights are 
being granted because making “a partition of goods” has good consequences, 
regardless of whether it is necessary to prevent injury. Thus, it seems clear that, if 
such consequentialist justifications for property rights exist, P2 is false. And, once 
again, the problem seems to be hasty generalization. When one focuses on goods 
                                               
19 “The Constitution of the United States,” Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8. 
20 See Cruft, “Against Individualistic Justiﬁcations of Property Rights.” 
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like air and water, it is extremely difficult to imagine consequentialist reasons for 
instituting ownership practices (under normal circumstances). Once we move to 
other goods—e.g., those IP concerns—such reasons aren’t hard to imagine at all. 
 
3. Implications: Theory and Practice 
Each of the theories discussed in the previous section appeals to values for which 
property rights may well be necessary, irrespective of how abundant goods are. One 
might think the implication clear: Insofar as one of these views is correct—or at 
least, insofar as one ought to countenance that possibility—the thesis that property 
rights presuppose scarcity is either false or, at least, seriously under-motivated. It 
must be admitted, however, that at the theoretical level, things are not quite so 
simple. Indeed, nothing said so far demonstrates that the argument presented in §1 
is unsound. For one way to respond to the apparent tension between the argument 
in §1 and the views in §2 is to claim, not that property rights do not presuppose 
scarcity, but that I have misunderstood the nature of scarcity itself.21 Here is one 
example of how this might go: Take the Hegelian view discussed above, according 
to which property rights help us to respect the value of self-expression. One might 
argue that in addition to being rendered scarce when my possession of them 
precludes your possession of them, goods are rendered scarce when my possession 
of them undermines their expressive power for you. In that case, it might yet turn 
out that property rights do presuppose scarcity; it’s just that many more things than 
we’ve typically thought turn out to be scarce!  
I will not attempt to settle the theoretical issue here. This is not because it is 
not important, but because, ultimately, it does not affect the matter at hand. What 
matters here is that, regardless of the correct understanding of scarcity, proponents, 
like Hume, have clearly relied on a conception of scarcity that entails something 
like “lack of physical abundance.”22 And it is this that the values discussed in §2 call 
into question. To take the obvious example, the “Hegelian” understanding of 
                                               
21 Alternatively, you might hold that I’ve misunderstood the nature of rivalry, or that I’ve 
neglected to recognize certain ways of delineating good types. None of this affects the points to 
come. 
22 An anonymous reviewer offered a helpful distinction between “empirical scarcity”—scarcity 
that arises from, e.g., a physically limited number of resources—and “normative scarcity”—
restrictions on access that we impose (perhaps, say, because we recognize the value of self-
expression). With this distinction in mind, one might read my argument as contending that the 
argument presented in §1 is refuted (or at least its premises severely under-motivated) insofar as 
the scarcity in question is empirical scarcity. Since it seems to be empirical scarcity that people 
have had in mind in drawing on Hume’s view—e.g., in challenging IP—I take this to be an 
important result insofar as our concern is the practical upshot of Hume’s argument. 
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scarcity just proposed does nothing to undermine the value of IP since, as already 
discussed, whether my possession of a good token undermines its expressive power 
for you may have nothing to do with how abundant that good type is.23 
Practically speaking, then, it doesn’t particularly matter whether we give up 
the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity or just rethink what scarcity is. 
Either way, the conclusion remains: The arguments that have been offered for the 
thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity fail to motivate the idea that a 
good’s unlimited availability makes it unjust for us to grant persons exclusive rights 
over it.  
 
4. Emerging Technologies and Non-Scarce Property: Beyond IP 
Thus ends my critique of the thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity. Before 
concluding, however, I wish to address one further issue. As mentioned earlier, 
there might be arguments other than the one presented in §1 for embracing the 
thesis that property rights presuppose scarcity (in Hume’s sense). In this section, I 
consider an argument that has been presented as such in order to further highlight 
the need to distinguish the debate over the thesis that property rights presuppose 
scarcity from the debate over IP. 
What, though, is really wrong with recognizing “new” property rights? 
After all, since new ideas, artistic creations, and innovations continually enrich us, 
what is the harm in moving with the times by recognizing new forms of property? 
The problem is that if property rights are recognized in non-scarce resources, this 
necessarily means that property rights in tangible resources are correspondingly 
diminished.24 
Suppose I have an idea for a new kind of boat, which is made entirely out of 
wood. You own a large quantity of wood. If I am granted IP over my idea, claims 
Kinsella, I diminish your property rights in your wood because your authority over 
that wood is limited; in particular, you cannot use it, without my permission, to 
construct a boat that is an expression of my idea: 
[T]he IP advocate must propose some homesteading rule along the 
following lines: “A person who comes up with some useful or 
creative idea which can guide or direct an actor in the use of his 
own tangible property thereby instantly gains a right to control all 
                                               
23 Again, one might instead suggest that when a good has expressive power for me, there are no 
other goods of the relevant type. It should be clear, though, that this wouldn’t affect the point in 
any substantive way. 
24 Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 43. 
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other tangible property in the world, with respect to that property’s 
similar use.” This new-fangled homesteading technique is so 
powerful that it gives the creator rights in third parties’ already 
owned tangible property.25 
For our purposes, the strength of this argument against patents and other IP 
schemes is largely irrelevant. Indeed, let us grant, for the moment, that such 
schemes really do grant one objectionable control over others’ property. What 
matters here is that the features of IP that make this the case are not features of 
non-scarce goods generally speaking. Suppose that I build a machine that can 
produce hamburgers at zero cost—say, through atomic matter construction, thus not 
requiring raw materials such as ground beef. This would make hamburgers (at least 
of the sort made by this machine) non-rivalrous; your having a hamburger would in 
no way interfere with my having one. Suppose, further, that I were granted sole 
ownership of the machine and its issue. Here I am with my infinite pile of 
hamburgers and there you are going about business as usual. It is hard to see how 
this would in any way diminish your property rights in anything you own.26 
Indeed, claiming that this situation affects your property rights in any way seems 
like a total non sequitor. 
It is an interesting question what feature of IP Kinsella is latching onto here, 
and thus exactly what class of properties his argument, if successful, would show to 
be an illegitimate object of property rights. I will not pursue this question here. 
What matters for our purposes is only that Kinsella’s argument, with its clear focus 
on IP, constitutes further evidence of the frequency and ease with which theorists 
have conflated the issues of the justification of IP, on the one hand, and the 
legitimacy of property rights in non-scarce goods, on the other. This conflation is 
understandable given the aforementioned fact that, until recently, IP was the only 
instance of property rights being granted in non-scarce goods. But recent and 
prospective technological advances have changed all that, and it is a change we 
must be careful to acknowledge. Being careful to differentiate the general issue of 
property rights and scarcity from the justification of IP is an important first step.  
 
 
                                               
25 Ibid., 43–44. 
26 In fact, ironically, it may be that what would affect someone’s property rights would be the 
thesis that one cannot own non-scarce goods. Suppose that Ted owns a hamburger shop where 
he makes hamburgers just like the ones my machine produces. If property rights presuppose 
scarcity, then, arguably, once I make my machine, Ted would cease to own the hamburgers he 
produces! 
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4. Conclusion 
The primary purpose of this paper has been to argue that, whether or not we 
ultimately decide to retain some version of the thesis that property rights 
presuppose scarcity, we have little reason to think that it can be deployed as its 
proponents have typically thought. Insofar as we recognize values like those 
discussed in §2, we may well find justification for granting persons exclusive rights 
in infinitely abundant goods. Given the increasing importance of IP, and the 
growing likelihood that certain tangible goods will become (nearly) infinitely 
abundant, recognizing this is important, now more than ever.  
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